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ESSAY 
The Shifting Tides of Merger 
Litigation 
Matthew D. Cain* 
Jill Fisch** 
Steven Davidoff Solomon*** 
Randall S. Thomas**** 
In 2015, Delaware made several important changes to its laws 
concerning merger litigation. These changes, which were made in 
response to a perception that levels of merger litigation were too high and 
that a substantial proportion of merger cases were not providing value, 
raised the bar, making it more difficult for plaintiffs to win a lawsuit 
challenging a merger and more difficult for plaintiffs’ counsel to collect 
a fee award. 
We study what has happened in the courts in response to these 
changes. We find that the initial effect of the changes has been to decrease 
the volume of merger litigation, to increase the number of cases that are 
dismissed, and to reduce the size of attorneys’ fee awards. At the same 
time, we document an adaptive response by the plaintiffs’ bar. Merger 
cases are being filed in other state courts or in federal court, presumably 
in an effort to escape the application of the new Delaware rules. 
This responsive adaptation offers important lessons about the 
entrepreneurial nature of merger litigation and the limited ability of the 
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courts to reduce the potential for litigation abuse. In particular, we find 
that plaintiffs’ attorneys respond rationally to these changes by shifting 
their filing patterns, and that defendants respond in kind. We argue, 
however, that more expansive efforts to shut down merger litigation, 
such as through the use of fee-shifting bylaws, are premature and create 
too great a risk of foreclosing beneficial litigation. We also examine 
Delaware’s dilemma in maintaining a balance between the rights of 
managers and shareholders in this area. 
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INTRODUCTION 
In recent years, over 96% of publicly announced mergers have 
attracted a shareholder lawsuit,1 with many mergers attracting suits 
in multiple jurisdictions.2 This extraordinarily high litigation rate has 
drawn criticism from those who claim that the bulk of merger litigation 
 
 1. Private litigation is the dominant mechanism for challenging the price, fairness, or 
disclosures in connection with a public company merger. SEC enforcement actions have typically 
been limited to particular transaction contexts such as reverse mergers and, even in such cases, 
are addressed exclusively to disclosure issues. See, e.g., Paul Rodel, A Look at Market Trends in 
Reverse Mergers, LAW360 (Mar. 21, 2017, 2:05 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/904096/a-
look-at-market-trends-in-reverse-mergers [https://perma.cc/E7Y2-WHE5] (describing SEC 
enforcement actions in several reverse merger cases in 2011). 
 2. Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Takeover Litigation in 2014 (Feb. 20, 2015) 
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2567902 
[https://perma.cc/GP7L-Q53Y]. 
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is frivolous.3 Critics also observe that merger litigation is typically 
settled without material benefit to shareholders but with a significant 
fee paid to the lead plaintiffs’ attorneys filing the case.4 
In the summer and fall of 2015, the Delaware courts forcefully 
responded to this criticism. In several decisions, judges openly 
questioned the value of so-called disclosure-only merger litigation 
settlements in which the only relief provided to the plaintiff class was 
additional disclosure by the takeover parties.5 In particular, the courts 
criticized the lack of materiality of the additional disclosures and the 
overly broad releases negotiated by the parties.6 This judicial push back 
culminated in the January 2016 Delaware Chancery Court decision, In 
re Trulia, which held that the Delaware courts would no longer 
countenance merger litigation settlements that did not achieve 
meaningful benefits for shareholders.7 The court specifically rejected 
the proposed disclosure-only settlement in that case which provided for 
additional nonmaterial disclosures, a broad release, and a fee award to 
plaintiffs’ counsel.8 
At the same time, the Delaware courts significantly restricted 
the substantive ability of plaintiffs to win takeover-related claims by 
 
 3. See, e.g., Gregory A. Markel & Gillian G. Burns, Assessing a Judicial Solution to Abusive 
Merger Litigation, LAW360 (Nov. 19, 2015, 9:59 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/ 
728061/assessing-a-judicial-solution-to-abusive-merger-litigation [https://perma.cc/YG87-JB2A] 
(observing that “lawsuits are filed after virtually every public merger is announced, in many cases 
with little regard to the merits of the claim”). 
 4. Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Confronting the Peppercorn 
Settlement in Merger Litigation: An Empirical Analysis and a Proposal for Reform, 93 TEX. L. REV. 
557, 559 (2015). But see Phillip R. Sumpter, Adjusting Attorneys’ Fee Awards: The Delaware Court 
of Chancery’s Answer to Incentivizing Meritorious Disclosure-Only Settlements, 15 U. PA. J. BUS. 
L. 669, 674 (2013) (defending the value of disclosure-only settlements in merger litigation). 
 5. E.g., Transcript of Settlement Hearing and Rulings of the Court at 74–75, In re Aruba 
Networks Stockholder Litig., No. 10765-VCL (Del. Ch. Oct. 9, 2015); Transcript of Settlement and 
Hearings of the Court at 14, In re Riverbed Tech., Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10484-VCG (Del. 
Ch. Sept. 17, 2015); Settlement Hearing and Request for Attorneys’ Fees and the Court’s Rulings 
at 45–46, Acevedo v. Aeroflex Holding Corp., No. 9730-VCL (Del. Ch. July 8, 2015). 
 6. See Fisch et al., supra note 4, at 591–92 (describing growing judicial criticism of 
disclosure-only settlements). 
 7. In re Trulia, 129 A.3d 884, 899 (Del. Ch. 2016). The Trulia court found that, because the 
supplemental disclosures obtained by the plaintiffs in the settlement were not material, they 
“provided no meaningful benefit to stockholders.” Id.; see also Transcript of Settlement Hearing 
and Rulings of the Court at 37, 40, Assad v. World Energy Sols., Inc., No. 10324-CB (Del. Ch. Aug. 
20, 2015) (stating that “it should be pretty clear from some of the questions that I’m asking and 
some of the recent hearings . . . that there is a lot of concern in this court about nonmonetary 
settlements,” and “there is going to be more scrutiny on some of the give and the get of these 
things”). 
 8. Trulia, 129 A.3d at 907. 
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adopting more deferential standards of judicial review in these cases.9 
In Corwin v. KKR Financial Holdings LLC, the Delaware Supreme 
Court held that the business judgment rule is “the appropriate standard 
of review for a post-closing damages action when a merger that is not 
subject to the entire fairness standard of review has been approved by 
a fully informed, uncoerced majority of the disinterested 
stockholders.”10 The Chancery Court extended Corwin’s holding in 
Volcano to cases involving a tender offer.11 The net effect of these two 
cases was to limit substantially the availability of a post-closing suit for 
damages. Only if the target company failed to disclose the alleged 
improprieties prior to shareholder approval of the transaction would the 
court allow a claim to proceed.12 
These decisions made the successful prosecution of merger 
litigation cases more difficult. They reduced the likelihood that a 
plaintiff could recover damages by challenging a merger involving a 
Delaware corporation. In addition, they reduced the likelihood that 
plaintiffs’ counsel could receive a significant fee award by bringing 
litigation in the Delaware courts. 
The Delaware legislature also responded to the increase in 
multijurisdictional litigation. In 2015, the legislature adopted 
amendments to the Delaware General Corporation Law explicitly 
authorizing issuers to adopt forum selection bylaws,13 which would 
enable Delaware corporations to halt the filing of merger-related suits 
in multiple states.14 Issuers’ widespread adoption of these bylaws both 
before and after the legislative response provided some reason for 
Delaware courts to expect that any crack-down on merger litigation 
 
 9. Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall S. Thomas, The Rise and Fall of Delaware’s Takeover 
Standards, in THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN CHANGING TIMES (Steven Davidoff Solomon & 
Randall S. Thomas eds., forthcoming 2018).  
 10. Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 305–06 (Del. 2015). 
 11. In re Volcano Corp. Stockholder Litig., 143 A.3d 727, 750 (Del. Ch. 2016). 
 12. The previous year, the Delaware Supreme Court for the first time applied the deferential 
business judgment standard of review in the context of a controlling shareholder merger, making 
shareholder litigation more difficult in that context. Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 
644 (Del. 2014). 
 13. DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(b)(4), 109(b) (West 2017). The legislation codified the 
Delaware Chancery Court’s decision in Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp., 
73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013), upholding the validity of a board-adopted forum selection bylaw. 
 14. Prior to the legislation, corporations had experimented with the adoption of forum 
selection bylaws. Joseph Grundfest, The History and Evolution of Intra-Corporate Forum Selection 
Clauses: An Empirical Analysis, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 333, 337 (2012). In Boilermakers, the Delaware 
Supreme Court upheld the facial validity of such bylaws, and this holding was ratified by the 2015 
legislation. 73 A.3d at 934. Notably, however, the legislation prohibits Delaware corporations from 
excluding the Delaware courts as a permissible forum. See Jill E. Fisch, The New Governance and 
the Challenge of Litigation Bylaws, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 1637, 1640 (2016) (explaining and analyzing 
the scope of the Delaware legislation). 
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would not simply shift these cases out of Delaware. This then provided 
the foundation for Trulia and its progeny.15  
In this Essay, we explore the effect of these developments on the 
shifting dynamics of merger litigation. We focus, in particular, on 
disclosure-only settlements and the related phenomenon of 
multijurisdictional litigation. We hypothesize that, as many 
commentators have long recognized, plaintiffs and their lawyers 
respond to litigation incentives. Specifically, we predict that the 
increased difficulty of bringing a successful claim for money damages 
and the reduced likelihood that plaintiffs’ attorneys will receive a fee 
award in the absence of a recovery of money damages will push 
plaintiffs’ attorneys to find ways to file and resolve merger litigation 
outside of Delaware despite the presence of forum selection clauses.16 
We also expect that plaintiffs’ lawyers will find alternative ways to 
bring and prosecute merger-related suits in order to continue to collect 
attorneys’ fees. 
One such avenue is to file merger litigation in federal court. 
Forum selection bylaws prohibit merger litigation from being pursued 
in state courts outside of Delaware, but they do not prevent plaintiffs 
from bringing federal suits alleging disclosure violations under Rule 
14a-9, the federal prohibition against proxy fraud.17 
Another option is collusion between plaintiffs’ counsel and the 
defendant corporation. Even in corporations that have adopted a forum 
selection bylaw, the board of directors may waive the application of that 
bylaw and allow the corporation to be sued in a non-Delaware forum. 
This enables the corporation to negotiate a settlement on terms that are 
now prohibited in Delaware by the Trulia decision. Along similar lines, 
in situations where the plaintiffs can credibly allege that the filing of 
their case led to increased disclosures by the defendants that mooted 
the litigation, the parties can settle disclosure-only cases on the grounds 
of “mootness.” In such cases, defendants can voluntarily compensate 
plaintiffs’ counsel through a “mootness fee.”  
We test the incidence of these responses in the first wave of 
merger cases following the Trulia decision. Our empirical analysis in 
this Essay examines a dataset of merger litigation for deals over $100 
 
 15. See Lawrence A. Hamermesh, How Long Do We Have to Play the “Great Game?,” 100 IOWA 
L. REV. BULLETIN 31, 37 (2015) (arguing that forum selection clauses are likely to substantially 
diminish multiforum merger litigation). 
 16. Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, A Great Game: The Dynamics of State 
Competition and Litigation, 100 IOWA L. REV. 165, 166 (2015). 
 17. 17 C.F.R. § 240.14a-9 (2017). 
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million completed from 2003 through October 2017.18 We find that 
overall levels of merger litigation initially declined but have risen back 
as plaintiffs’ attorneys have adapted to the new regime. In 2013, 96% of 
all completed deals were challenged in at least one lawsuit. That 
number declined to 73% in 2016 but rose to 85% in 2017.  
On the other hand, as we predicted, plaintiffs appear, in the 
short term at least, to be trying to avoid the effects of the changes in 
Delaware law by filing their cases elsewhere. Litigation brought in the 
Delaware Chancery Court has declined substantially. Of the deals 
completed in 2016, only 34% were challenged in Delaware, while 61% 
were challenged in other states and 39% in federal court. During the 
first ten months of 2017 the trend accelerated, with only 9% in 
Delaware compared to 87% in federal court.19 The latter number, which 
represents a significant increase in the percentage of cases filed in 
federal court, seems to be an attempt to avoid the impact of forum 
selection bylaws. 
We also observe differences in case outcomes. In 2016, 43% of 
deal litigation settled compared to 63% in 2014. Within Delaware, only 
6% of cases settled in 2016, the lowest rate over the past decade. We 
find no evidence to indicate that the quality of these settlements differs 
substantially from that in prior years. We also find a substantial 
increase in dismissals; in particular, the rate at which cases are 
dismissed spiked to 89% in 2017. Finally, we find a rising use of 
dismissal combined with the mootness fee. In 2016, 22% of cases were 
resolved in this manner, while so far in 2017 this rate has skyrocketed 
to 75%—an all-time high.20 Plaintiffs’ attorneys’ fees have also declined. 
In 2014—the year before Trulia—the median attorneys’ fee was 
$500,000. In 2017, it was $280,000. 
 We find little evidence of collusion. In no cases in our sample 
did defendants appear to ignore forum selection clauses in order to 
 
 18. We limit our analysis to larger transactions, as do many similar studies, because larger 
deals are more likely to attract interest from the plaintiffs’ bar. See, e.g., Elliott J. Weiss & 
Lawrence J. White, File Early, Then Free Ride: How Delaware Law (Mis)Shapes Shareholder Class 
Actions, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1797, 1823 n.87 (2004) (employing similar approach). 
 19. The percentages do not sum to 100% because of multiple cases in multiple forums.  
 20. In the past year, the Chancery Court has approved such fees, albeit at a reduced rate. See 
In re Xoom Corp. Stockholder Litig., No. 11263-VCG (Del. Ch. Aug. 4, 2016) (rejecting mootness 
fee request of $275,000 by allowing a smaller fee of $50,000); In re Receptos, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 
No. 11316-CB, slip op. at 76 (Del. Ch. July 21, 2016) (reducing mootness fee from $350,000 to 
$100,000, stating that: 
[A] lesson to take away from this [is that there] is no right to cover one’s supposed time 
and expenses just because you sue on a deal, and plaintiffs should not expect to receive 
a fee in the neighborhood of $300,000 for supplemental disclosures in a post-Trulia 
world unless some of the supplemental information is material under the standards of 
Delaware law). 
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avoid the effect of Trulia by negotiating a settlement in another 
jurisdiction that included a release. In five cases, however, litigation 
was resolved in another state through dismissal and payment of a 
mootness fee to plaintiffs’ counsel even though the issuer had a forum 
selection bylaw in place requiring that the litigation be pursued in 
Delaware. 
Our sample represents the first wave of litigation response to 
the developments in merger law. As a result, our findings are 
necessarily preliminary. Nonetheless, our results document what 
commentators have often predicted: litigation practices respond to 
changes in the law and, in the short term, plaintiffs’ lawyers will seek 
alternate forms of recourse if Delaware law becomes more restrictive. 
Because of the time frame that we studied, we cannot evaluate 
the long-term consequences of the changes in Delaware law. 
Specifically, the extent to which the federal courts and other state 
courts will adhere to Trulia and the other components of Delaware 
merger law is unclear. We note that at least one federal court has 
explicitly followed Trulia and refused to validate a disclosure-only 
settlement.21 In addition, as two of us have noted elsewhere, federal law 
contains a variety of safeguards against frivolous litigation that may 
frustrate attempts to use federal court litigation as a substitute.22 As a 
result, it seems likely that the shift of deal cases into federal court will 
work itself out as federal courts address these cases. 
More broadly, our results highlight the responsiveness of 
shareholder litigation to changes in the law and venue options. 
Plaintiffs’ and defendants’ attorneys will make moves and 
countermoves as they seek to shift venues and move to filing alternative 
forms of shareholder litigation. For example, barriers in Delaware to 
deal litigation appear to have led to an increase in the number of filings 
seeking relief under the Delaware appraisal statute. 
We also examine claims that Delaware has not done enough to 
eradicate frivolous lawsuits using the prism of Type I error (false 
positives) and Type II error (false negatives). If Delaware makes its law 
less favorable for plaintiffs to reduce the risk of frivolous lawsuits 
(lowering Type I error), it risks increasing Type II error by blocking out 
valuable cases that address managerial misconduct. Extreme actions to 
cut down on strike suits, like fee-shifting bylaws, will inevitably trade 
off fewer frivolous cases for fewer good cases.23 
 
 21. In re Walgreen Co. Stockholder Litig., 832 F.3d 718, 725 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 22. Fisch et al., supra note 4, at 597–98. 
 23. See, e.g., Albert H. Choi, Fee-Shifting and Shareholder Litigation (Va. Law & Econ., 
Research Paper No. 2016-15, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2840947 [https://perma.cc/Y8FX-
NCEV] (modeling this trade-off).  
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Finally, we revisit the competition between Delaware and other 
states to analyze how the new, more restrictive rules will impact it. We 
find that other states may seek to attract litigation by offering a more 
attractive environment for plaintiffs’ counsel. The greater risk for 
Delaware than losing its cases is losing incorporations as a consequence 
of its efforts to adopt litigation reforms.24 We also argue that some 
Delaware corporate law stakeholders, especially Delaware lawyers, 
may push back against overly stringent standards for shareholder 
litigation. Adaptive responses to these regulatory changes push and 
pull at Delaware’s equilibrium. 
In the end, we counsel caution in responding to the fluid 
situation. The dynamic nature of the merger litigation game shows that 
the pattern is both adaptive and still a work in progress. The better 
choice appears to be to wait and ascertain the full effect of forum 
selection clauses and the federal court response to these issues.  
In the remainder of the Essay, Part I discusses the problem of 
merger litigation and the recent developments, including the Trulia 
decision. Part II sets forth our empirical analysis. Part III considers the 
implications of our results. A brief conclusion follows. 
I. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN MERGER LITIGATION 
In recent years, many commentators have argued that merger 
litigation is fundamentally broken.25 Virtually all deals are challenged 
through litigation—with the rate of such challenges in deals over $100 
million hovering between 94% and 96%.26 In addition, most large 
mergers are challenged in multiple lawsuits filed in different courts.27 
In 2013, the average number of such lawsuits was more than seven per 
merger.28 Lawsuits are brought by a number of different plaintiffs’ 
 
 24. Commentators have long expressed concern about the prospect that litigants might seek 
to avoid the impact of Delaware decisions by filing lawsuits in courts outside of Delaware. See, e.g., 
John Armour, Bernard Black & Brian Cheffins, Is Delaware Losing Its Cases?, 9 J. EMPIRICAL 
LEGAL STUD. 605, 606 (2012). 
 25. See, e.g., Marc Wolinsky & Ben Schireson, Deal Litigation Run Amok: Diagnosis and 
Prescriptions, 47 REV. SEC. & COMMODITIES REG. 1, 1 (2014) (arguing that “the system is broken, 
that shareholder suits are being filed regardless of the merits, and that shareholder plaintiffs are 
imposing a dead weight on society”). 
 26. Fisch et al., supra note 4, at 558–59; see also In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 
884, 907 (Del. Ch. 2016) (noting the high rate of merger litigations). 
 27. Fisch et al., supra note 4, at 604–05. 
 28. Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Takeover Litigation in 2013, at 1–2 (Ohio 
State Pub. Law, Working Paper No. 236, 2014), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2377001 
[https://perma.cc/MCJ3-C2AW].  
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firms that then compete with each other over control of the case and 
receipt of a fee award.29 
There are several legal bases for challenging a merger.30 Most 
merger lawsuits include claims for breach of fiduciary duty, including 
allegations that the board failed to adhere to its duty under Revlon to 
maximize shareholder value.31 These claims are commonly linked with 
a claim that the merger documents failed to make adequate 
disclosure.32 Plaintiffs may also challenge the disclosures made in a 
merger by filing a proxy fraud claim under section 14(a) of the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.33 Finally, if the merger involves a 
controlling shareholder, a management buy-out, or other conflict of 
interest, the plaintiff may allege a violation of the duty of loyalty.34 
Although mergers are subject to frequent challenges, the 
benefits from this litigation to the plaintiff class, in many cases, are 
limited. To be sure, some merger lawsuits identify serious misconduct 
and produce substantial monetary recoveries.35 In addition, some 
lawsuits result in a change in the merger terms, such as a reduction in 
the amount of a break-up fee.36 These decisions have an impact beyond 
a single case in that they announce standards of conduct that guide 
 
 29. See Minor Myers, Fixing Multi-Forum Shareholder Litigation, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 467, 
469 (explaining that counsel “regularly file identical claims in more than one forum and then 
compete with each other for position in settling with defendants”). The prospect that class counsel 
will engage in a reverse auction in which they agree to cheaply settle a case in order to receive a 
fee award has long been recognized as a risk in class action litigation that is not unique to merger 
cases. See, e.g., Rhonda Wasserman, Dueling Class Actions, 80 B.U. L. REV. 461, 473 (2000) 
(describing the problem of a reverse auction).  
 30. Plaintiffs also have the right to dissent from the merger and seek a judicial determination 
of the fair value of their shares under the Delaware appraisal statute. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 262 
(West 2017). 
 31. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 173, 182–83 (Del. 1986). 
 32. Fisch et al., supra note 4, at 564. 
 33. 15 U.S.C. § 78n(a) (2012). 
 34. See, e.g., Kahn v. M&F Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644–45 (Del. 2014) (alleging 
violation of the duty of loyalty in the context of a controlling stockholder freeze-out merger). 
 35. See, e.g., In re Dole Food Co. Stockholder Litig., No. 9079-VCL, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 223, 
at *83 (Aug. 27, 2015) (imposing liability of $148 million for breaches of the duty of loyalty); In re 
Activision Blizzard, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 124 A.3d 1025, 1030 (Del. Ch. 2015) (approving $275 
million settlement); In re Rural/Metro Corp. Stockholders Litig., 102 A.3d 205, 224 (Del. Ch. 2014) 
(entering judgment against financial advisor for $76 million); see also Joel Edan Friedlander, 
Vindicating the Duty of Loyalty: Using Data Points of Successful Stockholder Litigation as a Tool 
for Reform, 72 BUS. LAW. 623, 626 (2017) (identifying data points of successful stockholder 
litigation and arguing that these data points should inform the discussion of stockholder litigation 
reform).  
 36. These are known as amendment settlements and are viewed as superior to disclosure-
only settlements as they offer some substantive changes. See Fisch et al., supra note 4, at 576 
(“[B]ecause amendments should improve the terms of the merger or the quality of the procedures 
used in reaching a final agreement, amendment settlements should increase shareholder voting 
in favor of the merger.”). 
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participants in future transactions. They may also influence the terms 
on which challenges are settled in the absence of a reported judicial 
opinion.37  
The vast majority of merger challenges, however, are resolved 
through a settlement in which the target company agrees to make 
additional disclosures in the proxy statement and not to oppose a 
request by plaintiffs’ counsel for a fee award.38 The settlement also 
includes a release of all possible merger-related claims, thereby 
insulating the merger from further attack. Although corrective 
disclosures can, in theory, provide value to the plaintiff class, they often 
do not.39 
A related development is the increase in Delaware appraisal 
litigation.40 Although class actions alleging a breach of fiduciary duty 
have traditionally been the dominant litigation strategy,41 both the 
frequency and size of appraisal claims have grown dramatically in the 
last several years.42 Commentators have argued that this trend was 
due, in part, to the fact that the appraisal statute mandated that courts 
award interest in appraisal cases at a statutory rate that, in recent 
years, has substantially exceeded the market rate.43 The opportunity to 
collect the statutory interest rate at relatively low risk has led some to 
characterize appraisal litigation as “appraisal arbitrage” and to warn 
that the practice is having an adverse effect on merger activity.44 
 
 37. See Friedlander, supra note 35, at 626 (describing opinion in J.L. Schiffman & Co., Inc. 
Profit Sharing Tr. v. Standard Indus., Inc., No. 11267, 1993 WL 271441 (Del. Ch. July 19, 1993), 
in which the court sought to memorialize the value to plaintiffs of the unopposed settlement of a 
shareholder suit). 
 38. See Matthew D. Cain & Steven Davidoff Solomon, Takeover Litigation in 2015, at 5 (Jan. 
14, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Berkeley Center for Law, Business and the 
Economy), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2715890 [https://perma.cc/C9N2-67MS] (documenting the 
limited number of cases that are resolved other than through a disclosure-only settlement). 
 39. See, e.g., In re Walgreen Co. Stockholder Litig., 832 F.3d 718, 724 (7th Cir. 2016) (“The 
type of class action illustrated by this case—the class action that yields fees for class counsel and 
nothing for the class—is no better than a racket.”). 
 40. See Charles R. Korsmo & Minor Myers, Appraisal Arbitrage and the Future of Public 
Company M&A, 92 WASH. U. L. REV. 1551, 1553 (2015) (describing a tenfold increase in appraisal 
litigation from 2004 to 2013). 
 41. See Craig Boyd, Appraisal Arbitrage: Closing the Floodgates on Hedge Funds and Activist 
Shareholders, 65 KAN. L. REV. 497, 502 (2016) (“Over the past decade, appraisal claims have had 
a limited presence in Delaware courts and have been insignificant in terms of Delaware legislative 
reform.”). 
 42. Korsmo & Myers, supra note 40, at 1572–74. 
 43. See Wei Jiang, Tao Li, Danqing Mei & Randall Thomas, Appraisal: Shareholder Remedy 
or Litigation Arbitrage?, 59 J.L. & ECON. 697, 721 (2016) (finding evidence that the surge in 
appraisal rights is attributable in part to the high interest rate paid on claims).  
 44. Boyd, supra note 41, at 522. But see Jiang et al., supra note 43, at 698 (documenting 
growth in use of appraisal but defending its importance as a corporate governance remedy). 
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The rise in merger litigation led the Delaware legislature in 
2016 to make two significant changes to the appraisal statute. First, 
the legislature restricted appraisal filings to cases involving a minimum 
collective stake of $1 million, or 1% of the outstanding stock of the 
company. Second, the statute permitted issuers to reduce their 
exposure to the statutory interest rate by tendering some or all of the 
merger consideration to plaintiffs before the resolution of the case.45  
The appraisal amendments have been criticized, however, as 
insufficient.46 Moreover, they appear to have done nothing to stop the 
flow of appraisal rights cases in Delaware.47 In 2015, for instance, 
thirty-three deals were targeted with fifty-one appraisal petitions. By 
comparison, in 2016, forty-eight deals were challenged by seventy-seven 
appraisal petitions. Both 2015 and 2016 were record years with respect 
to both the number of deals challenged and number of petitions filed. 
The Delaware courts recognized the problems with merger 
litigation and, in the past several years, they began to take steps both 
to reduce the substantive scope of director liability in merger litigation 
and the incentives to plaintiffs’ counsel for bringing litigation 
challenges.48 The most recent development with respect to the 
substantive scope of director liability was the Delaware Supreme 
Court’s 2015 decision in Corwin v. KKR.49 In Corwin, the court held that 
the business judgment rule is the proper standard of review in a post-
closing action for damages when the transaction has been approved by 
a fully informed majority of disinterested shareholders. The court 
expressly noted that the heightened standards of review under cases 
 
 45. Boyd, supra note 41, at 508.  
 46. See Stanley Onyeador, Note, The Chancery Bank of Delaware: Appraisal Arbitrageurs 
Expose Need to Further Reform Defective Appraisal Statute, 70 VAND. L. REV. 339 (2017). But see 
Jiang et al., supra note 43, at 700 (arguing that statutory changes should mitigate appraisal 
litigation problems). 
 47. Michael Greene, M&A Deal Price Challenges Spiking in Delaware, BLOOMBERG: BNA 
(Jan. 13, 2017), https://www.bna.com/ma-deal-price-n73014449766/ [https://perma.cc/7PNQ-
ZTPA]. 
 48. The Delaware Supreme Court had previously held that the deferential business judgment 
rule rather than the more demanding entire fairness standard could be applied, in certain cases, 
to litigation challenges to freeze-out mergers (i.e., mergers where a controlling stockholder 
acquires the remaining minority interest). In MFW, the court held that the business judgment rule 
was the appropriate standard of review “where the merger is conditioned ab initio upon both the 
approval of an independent, adequately-empowered Special Committee that fulfills its duty of care; 
and the uncoerced, informed vote of a majority of the minority stockholders.” Kahn v. M&F 
Worldwide Corp., 88 A.3d 635, 644 (Del. 2014). The court also held in Leal v. Meeks (In re 
Cornerstone Therapeutics, Inc.), 115 A.3d 1173, 1180 (Del. 2015), that a plaintiff must plead 
nonexculpated claims against a defendant director to survive a motion to dismiss, regardless of 
the underlying standard of review, and that a board could satisfy its Revlon duties without 
conducting a market check in C&J Energy Services v. City of Miami General Employees’ & 
Sanitation Employees’ Retirement Trust, 107 A.3d 1049, 1071 (Del. 2014).  
 49. Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304, 305–06 (Del. 2015). 
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such as Revlon and Unocal were only appropriate in actions for 
injunctive relief and were “not tools designed with post-closing money 
damages claims in mind.”50 The effect of Corwin was to provide a 
streamlined basis for a court facing a claim for damages in a third-party 
merger to dismiss the case on the pleadings.51  
At the same time, several decisions expressly questioned the 
practice of approving disclosure-only settlements of merger cases, 
noting the limited value provided by the corrective disclosures, the 
broad releases generated by the settlement, and the absence of an 
adversarial process by which to test the adequacy of the settlement 
terms.52 These concerns culminated in Chancellor Bouchard’s January 
2016 decision In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litigation.53 Trulia focused 
specifically on the appropriate legal standard for judicial approval of a 
disclosure-only settlement of a lawsuit challenging a merger. 
Chancellor Bouchard observed that the courts’ historic practice of 
approving disclosure-only settlements of “marginal value” and 
awarding plaintiffs’ counsel an attorneys’ fee in such cases was a 
component of the “dynamics that have fueled disclosure settlements of 
deal litigation.”54 Consequently, the court announced its intent to 
exercise greater vigilance in analyzing the reasonableness of a proposed 
disclosure-only settlement.55 The court explained that  
practitioners should expect that disclosure settlements are likely to be met with continued 
disfavor in the future unless the supplemental disclosures address a plainly material 
misrepresentation or omission, and the subject matter of the proposed release is narrowly 
circumscribed to encompass nothing more than disclosure claims and fiduciary duty 
claims concerning the sale process, if the record shows that such claims have been 
investigated sufficiently.56 
In Trulia, Chancellor Bouchard recognized that plaintiffs could 
respond to these doctrinal developments in several ways. One option, if 
 
 50. Id. at 312. 
 51. Subsequent decisions reaffirmed Corwin and applied it to mergers accomplished by 
means of a tender offer. See Singh v. Attenborough, 137 A.3d 151, 151–52 (Del. 2016) (explaining 
that “[w]hen the business judgment rule standard of review is invoked because of a vote, dismissal 
is typically the result”); In re Volcano Corp. Stockholder Litig., 143 A.3d 727, 743 (Del. Ch. 2016) 
(explaining that “the policy considerations underlying the holding in Corwin do not provide any 
basis for distinguishing between a stockholder vote and a tender offer”); In re Zale Corp. 
Stockholders Litig., No. 9388-VCP, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 274, at *8 (Oct. 29, 2015) (holding that 
“after the merger has been approved by a majority of disinterested stockholders in a fully informed 
vote, the standard for finding a breach of the duty of care under BJR is gross negligence”). 
 52. See, e.g., In re Aruba Networks, Inc. Stockholder Litig., No. 10765-VCL (Del. Ch. Oct. 9, 
2015); In re Riverbed Tech., Inc. Stockholders Litig., No. 10484-VCG, 2015 Del. Ch. LEXIS 241 
(Sept. 17, 2015).  
 53. In re Trulia, Inc. Stockholder Litig., 129 A.3d 884 (Del. Ch. 2016). 
 54. Id. at 891, 894. 
 55. Id. at 898.  
 56. Id. 
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the litigation involved plainly material disclosure deficiencies, was to 
seek injunctive relief prior to the closing of the merger.57 Although the 
Delaware courts have been reluctant to provide injunctive relief that 
would interfere with the shareholders’ ability to participate in an 
economically beneficial transaction,58 an injunction that is limited to 
corrective disclosure does not present that concern.59  
Another option is to dismiss the case on mootness grounds with 
the defendants voluntarily agreeing to pay counsel a mootness fee.60 
The extent to which mootness fees can be justified under a lesser 
standard than “plainly material” is unclear.61 In a post-Trulia opinion, 
Vice Chancellor Glasscock struggled with this question and ultimately 
awarded plaintiffs’ counsel a $50,000 mootness fee, reasoning that a fee 
could be justified even if the disclosures were merely “helpful” because 
the dismissal did not bind the stockholder class or result in a class-wide 
release.62  
A third option, not discussed by the Trulia opinion, is for counsel 
to seek to avoid the application of the recent Delaware decisions by 
filing in another jurisdiction.63 As discussed above, plaintiffs already 
frequently challenge mergers by filing suit in state courts outside of 
Delaware or in federal court.  
The extent to which other courts will follow these Delaware 
cases is unclear. To the extent that plaintiffs bring fiduciary duty claims 
outside of Delaware against Delaware directors, Delaware substantive 
 
 57. Id. at 896. 
 58. See, e.g., In re Delphi Fin. Grp. S’holder Litig., No. 7144-VCG, 2012 Del. Ch. LEXIS 45, 
at *7, *66–73 (Mar. 6, 2012) (refusing to enjoin merger where plaintiffs had demonstrated a 
reasonable likelihood of success on the merits of some claims “because the deal represents a large 
premium over market price”). 
 59. See, e.g., In re Pure Res., Inc. S’holders Litig., 808 A.2d 421, 452–53 (Del. Ch. 2002) 
(“[A]lthough I recognize that this court rightly hesitates to deny stockholders an opportunity to 
accept a tender offer, I believe that the risks of an injunction are outweighed by the need for 
adequate disclosure . . . .”). 
 60. Trulia, 129 A.3d at 897. 
 61. One report finds that “[p]laintiffs’ lawyers who have sought mootness fees have faced 
mixed but mostly negative results.” Keenan Lynch & Edward Micheletti, Key Developments in 
Delaware Corporation Law in 2016, JDSUPRA (Feb. 3, 2017), http://www.jdsupra.com/ 
legalnews/key-developments-in-delaware-43114/ [https://perma.cc/VQX4-24WK] (reporting “the 
court only granted amounts of $50,000 and $100,000, if any at all”). 
 62. In re Xoom Corp. Stockholder Litig., No. 11263-VCG, 2016 Del. Ch. LEXIS 117, at *10, 
*15 (Aug. 4, 2016). 
 63. See, e.g., Armour et al., supra note 24, at 607 (presenting statistics showing that an 
increasing percentage of cases involving Delaware corporations are being litigated outside of 
Delaware); Ted Mirvis, Anywhere but Chancery: Ted Mirvis Sounds an Alarm and Suggests Some 
Solutions, M&A J., May 2007, at 17, 17 (reporting statistics indicating that it had become “twice 
as likely as it was previous that the litigation will be brought and litigated outside of Delaware”). 
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law, such as Corwin, should govern those claims.64 On the other hand, 
the nonadversarial context of a proposed settlement and request for 
attorneys’ fees may dissuade a non-Delaware court from rejecting the 
proposed settlement on the grounds that the case might have been 
dismissed pursuant to Corwin. Similarly, courts in other states may not 
be willing to follow Trulia in evaluating the reasonableness of the 
settlement terms.65  
Indeed, a New York court recently refused to apply Trulia to a 
Delaware corporation, instead imposing an easier to meet standard for 
approval of disclosure-only settlements.66 In Gordon v. Verizon 
Communications, Inc.,67 the New York appellate court rejected the 
Trulia test and instead applied its own standard to approve a proposed 
settlement of litigation challenging the 2013 acquisition by Verizon for 
$130 billion of a 45% stake in Verizon Wireless held by Vodafone. The 
settlement required additional disclosure and allowed for the payment 
of an attorneys’ fee of $2 million. Although the lower court concluded 
that the additional disclosure was “unnecessary surplusage” and 
refused to award the requested fee, the appellate court reversed.68 
Applying its own test instead of Trulia, even though Verizon Wireless 
was a Delaware company, the court examined whether the proposed 
settlement was in the best interest of “shareholders” and the class as 
well as the “corporation.”69 The court found that although the disclosure 
provided “some . . . albeit minimal” benefit to the company, a settlement 
avoided “having to incur the additional legal fees and expenses of a 
 
 64. See, e.g., In re Crown Castle Int’l Corp., 247 S.W.3d 349, 352–53 (Tex. App. 2008) (holding 
that Delaware substantive corporate law, including pleading requirements that Delaware courts 
had characterized as substantive, applied to corporations incorporated in Delaware); see also 
Quinn v. Knight, No. 3:16-cv-610, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 151346, at *10 (E.D. Va. Nov. 1, 2016) 
(citing to Corwin v. KKR Fin. Holdings LLC, 125 A.3d 304 (Del. 2015), in the context of a Virginia 
corporation). 
 65. See Myers, supra note 29, at 471 (explaining that other state courts may “compete to offer 
the most shareholder-friendly interpretations of Delaware law or the most attractive procedures 
for pressing claims”). 
 66. Gordon v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 148 A.D.3d 146, 161–62, 164 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017) 
(approving a $2 million disclosure settlement and promulgating a multifactor test for consideration 
of such settlements). Prior to the Gordon decision, several New York trial courts had refused to 
approve disclosure-only settlements. See, e.g., In re Allied Healthcare S’holder Litig., No. 
652188/2011, 2015 WL 6499467, at *3 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 23, 2015); City Trading Fund v. Nye, No. 
651668/2014, 2015 WL 93894, at *19 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Jan. 7, 2015). 
 67. 148 A.D.3d at 149, 161–62. 
 68. Gordon v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., No. 653084/13, 2014 WL 7250212, at *7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 
Dec. 19, 2014), rev’d, 148 A.D.3d 146 (N.Y. App. Div. 2017). 
 69. Gordon, 148 A.D.3d at 159. 
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trial.”70 The court also considered the time and labor involved in the 
action and awarded the full $2 million fee to the attorneys.71 
Similarly, a Nevada attorney has written that Nevada offers 
issuers the opportunity to resolve strike suits “efficiently and 
effectively” by permitting these cases to be resolved through the 
traditional disclosure-only settlement coupled with a release and fee 
award, citing a number of decisions approving such settlements and, in 
at least one case, the award of a substantial attorneys’ fee.72 Whether 
other courts will follow these decisions is unclear. Indeed, even prior to 
Trulia, Texas had adopted another method of discouraging disclosure-
only settlements.73 
In federal court, Judge Posner explicitly endorsed the Trulia 
standard for the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals in In re Walgreen Co. 
Stockholder Litigation.74 Although Delaware law does not govern the 
substance of federal proxy fraud claims, the scope of such claims is 
focused on disclosure rather than substantive fairness and is therefore 
more limited than traditional merger litigation.75 In addition, the 
federal securities laws contain a number of safeguards to permit early 
dismissal of nonmeritorious claims.76  
Plaintiffs’ ability to avoid the impact of the Delaware decisions 
by filing in courts outside of Delaware will depend on another 
complication—the increasing adoption of forum selection provisions.77 
Forum selection provisions enable a corporation to designate the 
 
 70. Id. at 159–61. 
 71. It is unclear how broadly the holding of Gordon will be applied. In a recent New York 
case, City Trading Fund v. Nye, No. 651668/2014, 2018 WL 792283 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 8, 2018), a 
New York lower court interpreted Gordon’s “some benefit” standard to be equivalent to the 
standard for a mootness fee in Delaware and refused to approve a settlement that included “the 
payment of counsel fees in exchange for worthless supplemental disclosures.” Id. at *19. 
 72. Jeffrey S. Rugg, Strike Suit Certainty Remains the Status Quo in Nevada, LAW360 (Aug. 
11, 2015), http://www.law360.com/articles/689917/strike-suit-certainty-remains-the-status-quo-
in-nevada [https://perma.cc/VA3Q-3MAV]. 
 73. Texas law prohibits courts from awarding attorneys’ fees in a case in which there is no 
monetary recovery for the plaintiff class. Fisch et al., supra note 4, at 613. Although the provision 
was adopted to address coupon settlements in consumer class actions, a Texas appellate court 
applied it to merger litigation. Kazman v. Frontier Oil Corp., 398 S.W.3d 377, 387 (Tex. App. 2013). 
 74. 832 F.3d 718, 725 (7th Cir. 2016). 
 75. See Santa Fe Indus., Inc. v. Green, 430 U.S. 462, 477–78 (1977) (holding that “the fairness 
of the terms of the transaction is at most a tangential concern of the [federal] statute”). 
 76. See Fisch et al., supra note 4, at 613 (describing procedural safeguards including 
heightened pleading standard and discovery stay). 
 77. Some issuers also responded to the concerns about excessive litigation by adopting fee-
shifting bylaws, which impose liability for the corporation’s attorneys’ fees on unsuccessful 
plaintiffs. Although the Delaware Supreme Court upheld the validity of fee-shifting bylaws in ATP 
Tour, Inc. v. Deutscher Tennis Bund, 91 A.3d 554, 557 (Del. 2014), the Delaware legislature 
subsequently amended the statute to prohibit both fee-shifting bylaws and charter provisions. See 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §§ 102(f), 109(b) (West 2017). 
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jurisdiction in which shareholder suits must be filed; for Delaware 
corporations, that jurisdiction is typically Delaware.78 Vice Chancellor 
Laster first suggested approval of forum selection charter provisions in 
2010.79 For some years, the validity of such provisions was 
questionable.80 In 2013, however, then-Chancellor Strine upheld their 
validity in Boilermakers Local 154 Retirement Fund v. Chevron Corp.81 
The Delaware legislature subsequently ratified his decision and 
explicitly authorized Delaware corporations to adopt both forum 
selection charter and bylaw provisions.82  
As of August 2014, 746 U.S. public companies had adopted 
forum selection provisions.83 In theory, such provisions should prevent 
plaintiffs from evading the impact of the recent Delaware merger cases 
by filing in another jurisdiction. The typical forum selection provision, 
however, is not mandatory—the board has the authority to waive its 
application.84 As a result, it is possible even for issuers with a forum 
selection provision to be sued and settle litigation outside of Delaware 
if the board agrees to that action.  
What has been the initial impact of these developments on 
Delaware merger litigation? The situation is clearly still a work in 
progress, as judges and litigants work through the implications of the 
new legal climate. As one commentator noted: “It remains to be seen 
whether stockholder plaintiffs will experiment with new strategies and 
recalibrate, or if the trends of 2016 will lead to permanent changes in 
deal litigation practice.”85 Although it is too early to evaluate the long-
term effects, we present in the next Part some preliminary statistics.  
 
 78. The 2015 legislation requires that forum selection provisions for Delaware corporations 
designate a Delaware forum, but that designation need not be exclusive. §§ 102(f), 109(b). 
 79. See In re Revlon, Inc. S’holders Litig., 990 A.2d 940, 960 (Del. Ch. 2010) (“[I]f boards of 
directors and stockholders believe that a particular forum would provide an efficient and value-
promoting locus for dispute resolution, then corporations are free to respond with charter 
provisions selecting an exclusive forum for intra-entity disputes.”). 
 80. Roberta Romano & Sarath Sanga, The Private Ordering Solution to Multiforum 
Shareholder Litigation 10 (Eur. Corp. Governance Inst., Law Working Paper No. 295/2015, 2015), 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2624951 [https://perma.cc/MVD3-9489]. 
 81. 73 A.3d 934 (Del. Ch. 2013). 
 82. §§ 102(f), 109(b).  
 83. Romano & Sanga, supra note 80, at 2. 
 84. See Paul J. Collins & Michael J. Kahn, Deal Litigation After “Trulia,” DEL. BUS. CT. 
INSIDER (Apr. 27, 2016), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/Collins-Kahn-Deal-
Litigation-After-Trulia-DBCI-4-27-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/V55Z-ZY9U] (observing that “at least 
some companies [are waiving the application of a forum selection bylaw] to obtain the certainty 
associated with settlement”). 
 85. Lynch & Micheletti, supra note 61. 
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II. DATA AND EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
A. Data Set 
Our sample contains all the transactions listed in the FactSet 
MergerMetrics86 database and announced from 2003 through 2017 that 
meet the following criteria: (1) the target is a U.S. firm publicly traded 
on the New York Stock Exchange, American Stock Exchange, or 
NASDAQ; (2) the transaction size is at least $100 million; (3) the offer 
price is at least five dollars per share; (4) a merger agreement is signed 
and publicly disclosed through a filing with the Securities and 
Exchange Commission (“SEC”); and (5) the transaction has been 
completed as of October 20, 2017. This constitutes 2,101 unique deals.  
We then review by hand merger proxy statements and tender 
offer documents filed with the SEC to determine if litigation is brought 
with respect to the transaction. We document all class action litigation 
brought in connection with a merger, finding that litigation is brought 
in 1,355 transactions, or 64% of our sample. For litigation outcomes, 
attorneys’ fees, and settlement terms, we review public filings and 
obtain actual court filings. Court filings are obtained directly from the 
court, from public filings on the LexisNexis File and Serve Database, or 
Bloomberg Law and are also reviewed by hand.87 
B. Empirical Analysis 
We begin by setting forth in Chart 1 the total number of deals 
and associated litigation completed in each year over our sample period 
from 2003 to 2017.88 The sample includes all mergers with an aggregate 
value exceeding $100 million wherever the target corporation is 
incorporated. 
 
 
 86. More information about the database can be found at Bifurcated Termination Fees and 
Common Termination Events, FACTSET MERGERS (Sept. 3, 2014), https://www.mergermetrics.com 
[http://perma.cc/7U34-82CR]. 
 87. The data collection here is taken in part from a database compiled for a prior study by 
two of the coauthors. See Cain & Davidoff Solomon, supra note 16, at 487 (stating that the court 
filings are obtained directly from the court and from public filings on the LexisNexis File and Serve 
Database or on Bloomberg Law and are also reviewed by hand). 
 88. This chart records deals by date of completion. A transaction announced in 2014 and 
completed in 2015 would be marked in this chart as a 2015 transaction; the remaining tables follow 
the same convention. The numbers for 2017 are annualized figures. 
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Chart 1 also sets forth the percentage of completed deals 
attracting litigation for each year. The number of completed deals in 
our sample reached a high point of 287 in 2007, falling to 58 in 2009. In 
2015 and 2016, the number of completed deals was 142 and 166, 
respectively, a slight rise from 2010 to 2014, during which time the 
number of completed deals ranged from 117 to 134 deals. Litigation 
rates have fluctuated substantially over our sample period. From 2003 
to 2008, litigation challenges ranged from 33% of completed deals (2004) 
to 43% of completed deals (2008). There was a sharp rise in the 
litigation rate in 2009 to 76% of completed deals. This rise continued in 
2010 when 90% of completed deals attracted litigation.  
Litigation then peaked in 2013 at an astounding rate of 96% of 
all completed deals. In 2015, the litigation rate was 89%, but the rate 
was 92% for deals announced in the first half of 2015 and 85% in the 
second half of 2015 as the Delaware courts began to crack down on 
disclosure-only settlements. In 2016, the litigation rate fell to 73% of all 
completed deals, below the 2009 rate, and rose slightly to 85% during 
the first ten months of 2017.  
The rise in overall litigation rates was accompanied by a sharp 
rise in multijurisdictional litigation. Table 1 sets forth the percentage 
of cases filed in Delaware, other states, and the federal courts during 
our sample period. The final column reports the percentage of cases 
filed in more than one jurisdiction. 
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CHART 1: LITIGATION RATES BY DEAL COMPLETION
YEAR
Deals Litigation % with Litigation
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TABLE 1: FILINGS BY DEAL COMPLETION YEAR 
 
  
   % Filed in 
Multiple 
Jurisdictions  Deals 
% with 
Litigation % Delaware* 
% Other 
States* % Federal* 
2003 41 34% 7% 100% 7% 7% 
2004 140 33% 43% 78% 0% 33% 
2005 159 37% 39% 66% 7% 14% 
2006 210 39% 21% 82% 12% 17% 
2007 287 42% 28% 86% 13% 35% 
2008 152 43% 23% 92% 21% 31% 
2009 58 76% 34% 98% 20% 50% 
2010 134 90% 49% 88% 26% 53% 
2011 130 92% 51% 88% 39% 63% 
2012 118 90% 56% 88% 34% 69% 
2013 120 96% 52% 83% 32% 61% 
2014 117 91% 55% 73% 15% 41% 
2015 142 89% 60% 51% 20% 31% 
2016 166 73% 34% 61% 39% 33% 
2017 127 85% 9% 18% 87% 22% 
Total 2,101 64% 41% 74% 28% 42% 
* Note: Percentages sum to > 100% each year due to multijurisdictional filings. 
 
The percentages of filings in Delaware, other states, and the 
federal courts do not sum to 100% because of the fact that a single deal 
can be challenged by a lawsuit in Delaware, a lawsuit in another state, 
and a lawsuit in federal court. However, these numbers show that the 
number of filings in Delaware has fluctuated substantially. Most 
notably, filings in Delaware fell by almost 50% in 2016 and are down 
below 10% during the first ten months of 2017. In 2006, 21% of 
completed deals with litigation had a suit brought in Delaware, while 
82% of such deals had filings in other states and 12% had a federal 
complaint brought. The fall in Delaware filings from 2006 through 2008 
led to some assertions that plaintiffs’ lawyers were filing suit out of 
Delaware in order to seek better outcomes and that Delaware was 
“losing its cases.”89 As litigation rates increased starting in 2009, cases 
migrated back to Delaware, however. Delaware filings peaked in 2015, 
 
 89. See Armour et al., supra note 24 (finding that in a period from 1994 to 2010, Delaware 
courts were losing market share in lawsuits).  
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when 60% of completed deals had a Delaware filing, compared with a 
rate of other state filings of 51%.90  
The 2016–2017 filing numbers show the immediate impact of 
Trulia and its cohort. In addition to the fact that 2016 filings in 
Delaware are half the 2015 number, other state filings have increased 
from 51% to 61%. The most significant shift in filings is in federal court, 
which increased from 20% of filings in 2015 to 87% of filings in 2017—
by far the highest percentage rate for federal filings in our sample 
period. If this trend continues, merger litigation seems likely to become 
a matter largely for the federal courts. 
In Table 2 we further explore the effects of the Trulia decision 
and its cohort by examining litigation settlements over our sample 
period. The first column represents the total number of deals with 
litigation for which we located data on the case outcome (settled or 
dismissed). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 90. Not all firms in our sample are Delaware incorporated or headquartered, and so the 
number of Delaware filings can never reach 100%. Instead, the number of Delaware-incorporated 
or Delaware-headquartered targets is 65% of the sample, and so the 2015 rate is near the 
maximum litigation rate for Delaware. 
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TABLE 2: LITIGATION OUTCOMES BY DEAL COMPLETION YEAR 
 
Deals with 
Litigation* Settled Dismissed 
Settlement 
Rejected** 
Mootness 
Fees*** 
% of  
Settlements 
that are 
Disclosure-Only 
2003 11 55% 45% 0 0% 83% 
2004 44 66% 34% 0 0% 41% 
2005 56 54% 46% 1 0% 63% 
2006 78 71% 29% 0 0% 58% 
2007 109 68% 32% 0 0% 68% 
2008 65 69% 31% 0 0% 82% 
2009 41 73% 27% 0 0% 90% 
2010 111 82% 18% 0 0% 78% 
2011 110 80% 20% 0 0% 69% 
2012 100 78% 22% 1 1% 85% 
2013 109 77% 23% 1 0% 76% 
2014 104 63% 38% 2 3% 74% 
2015 117 45% 55% 2 14% 85% 
2016 97 43% 57% 1 22% 98% 
2017 91 11% 89% 0 75% 90% 
* Total number of deals with litigation for which data on the case outcome (settled or dismissed) 
is available. 
** Subset of dismissals. Includes effective rejections due to out-of-court mootness fee 
settlements. 
*** Percentage of all cases. Subset of dismissals. 
 
Settlement numbers lag filings since litigation can be time 
consuming and span years before a settlement or disposition occurs. In 
particular, trials or settlements providing money damages often occur 
several years after the initial filing. As a result, these outcomes may be 
underrepresented in our outcomes for recent deals. Nonetheless, the 
effects of Trulia and other decisions that have affected the ability to 
settle cases for a disclosure-only outcome are clear. The rate of 
dismissals has already risen sharply in 2017 to an astounding 89% of 
all cases. 
The rise of the mootness fee is also documented in Table 2. 
Litigation outcomes resulting in the payment of a mootness fee are near 
0% of cases prior to 2014, but in the wake of Trulia these cases became 
more significant. They comprised 14% of cases in 2015 and rose to 75% 
of cases by 2017. The payment of mootness fees for cases from 2015 and 
2016 can be largely explained as payment made to plaintiffs’ lawyers 
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abandoning already existing settlements that were negotiated prior to 
Trulia. However, in late 2016 and 2017 there were very significant 
numbers of mootness fee payments and accompanying case dismissals. 
Accordingly this appears to be an adaptive litigation strategy of 
plaintiffs.91  
A final development related to Table 2 is the decline of the 
amendment settlement, a settlement that changes the terms of the 
agreement.92 In 2016 there were only 2% of amendment settlements 
compared to 24% of settlements for deals completed in 2013. It may be 
the case that, like monetary settlements, settlements that involve an 
amendment to the merger terms are lagged and will not show up for 
transactions completed in 2015–2017 until future years, although this 
seems unlikely as the deals at issue have already been completed (and 
many cases have been dismissed). We asked a number of prominent 
M&A lawyers about the reasons for this development. They uniformly 
attributed the decrease to better drafting by transaction lawyers and 
the lack of extreme terms existent in prior years which justified such a 
settlement, an explanation that we have no way to test with our current 
data. Notably, however, the parties do not appear to be seeking to evade 
the effect of Trulia by shifting from disclosure-only settlements to 
amendment settlements, a trend that some had predicted would occur 
if Delaware courts limited their willingness to approve disclosure-only 
settlements.93  
In Table 3 we examine the effect of Trulia on attorneys’ fees in 
merger litigation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 91. See also Richard L. Renck, Court of Chancery Critically Reviewing “Mootness” Fee 
Applications, LEXOLOGY (Aug. 10, 2016), 
https://www.lexology.com/library/detail.aspx?g=29b6aab8-a7ab-498f-9eb7-22e5f2f2a162 
[https://perma.cc/U46V-Z4V9] (describing recent decisions evaluating mootness fee applications). 
 92. See Fisch et al., supra note 4, at 576 (describing amendment settlements). 
 93. See id. at 610 (discussing this possibility). 
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TABLE 3: MEDIAN ATTORNEYS’ FEES BY DEAL COMPLETION YEAR 
AND LITIGATION OUTCOME (IN THOUSANDS) 
 
# of 
Non-
Zero 
Fees 
All Non-
Zero 
Fees  
Nondisclosure 
Settlement 
Disclosure-
Only 
Settlement 
Mootness 
Fee 
2003 4 $425   $450 $499** N/A 
2004 25 $785   $1,050 $350 N/A 
2005 30 $400   $588 $395 N/A 
2006 52 $505   $1,118 $435 N/A 
2007 68 $643   $2,925 $525 N/A 
2008 41 $500   $893 $485 N/A 
2009 29 $575   $3,050 $575 N/A 
2010 89 $600   $1,375 $531 N/A 
2011 78 $600   $1,750 $500 N/A 
2012 73 $500   $1,940 $450 $4,000* 
2013 57 $490   $2,400 $450 N/A 
2014 49 $500   $900 $435 $450 
2015 54 $373   $825 $400 $200 
2016 20 $263   N/A $320 $238 
2017 11 $280  N/A $300 $265 
*   Note: $4 million mootness fee in 2012 for Ancestry.com. 
** Note: Disclosure-only fees in 2003 are higher than nondisclosure settlement fees. 
 
The first two columns of Table 3 report median attorneys’ fees 
for all settlements by year of deal completion. Again, because of a lag in 
consideration settlements, figures are lower for immediate years. 
However, median attorneys’ fees in disclosure-only settlements decline 
from a high of $575,000 in 2009, to $300,000 in 2017. The drop may be 
attributable to judges viewing disclosure-only settlements as providing 
lower value to the shareholders in the wake of Trulia and its progeny.  
The final column of Table 3 reports mootness fees. The $4 million 
fee for a deal completed in 2012 is an outlier, reflecting a large 
settlement in the Ancestry.com case.94 But for 2016 and 2017, median 
 
 94. In re Ancestry.com S’holder Litig., No. 7988-CS, 2012 Del. Ch. LEXIS 294 (Nov. 27, 2012). 
Ancestry.com was not a typical litigation case; it involved a don’t ask/don’t waive standstill and 
was one of the first decisions to challenge this type of arrangement. Accordingly, the fee was 
proportionately higher and an outlier. See Brian M. Lutz & Jefferson E. Bell, Chancery Court 
Provides Guidance on ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Waive’ Standstill Provisions, DEL. BUS. CT. INSIDER (Jan. 
16, 2013), http://www.gibsondunn.com/publications/Documents/LutzBell-
ChanceryCourtProvidesGuidance.pdf [https://perma.cc/R8W3-54VB] (describing early cases 
evaluating the propriety of don’t ask/don’t waive provisions).  
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mootness fees were $238,000 and $265,000, respectively. These 
numbers are below the medians for disclosure-only settlements and it 
is questionable whether they are sufficient to sustain a litigation 
practice in this area.  
Table 4 further analyzes how the Trulia change has affected 
Delaware litigation.  
 
TABLE 4: DELAWARE CASES AND ATTORNEYS’ FEES BY DEAL 
COMPLETION YEAR 
    Attorneys’ Fees ($k)  
Median Attorneys’ 
Fees ($k) for 
Disclosure-Only  
% Cases Going 
to DE Mean Median 
2003 0% N/A N/A N/A 
2004 44% $1,724 $725 $331 
2005 52% $602 $400 $353 
2006 16% $410 $330 $328 
2007 43% $2,698 $530 $415 
2008 28% $1,040 $850 $750 
2009 48% $1,627 $550 $500 
2010 49% $1,739 $710 $525 
2011 58% $3,098 $600 $400 
2012 41% $1,797 $475 $440 
2013 46% $3,165 $450 $414 
2014 55% $749 $473 $330 
2015 41% $1,337 $350 $315 
2016 10% N/A N/A N/A 
2017 N/A N/A N/A N/A 
 
Trulia’s consequences are reflected in the first column, which 
records those cases that are settled in Delaware as a percentage of deals 
involving Delaware-incorporated target corporations for which 
litigation is brought and can potentially be brought in Delaware. This 
drops to 10% in 2016 from 55% in 2014 and 41% in 2015. This drop 
documents that plaintiffs’ attorneys are avoiding Delaware for their 
settlements and dispositive litigation.  
In Table 4, we also denote changes in aggregate attorneys’ fees 
over the years. The findings in Table 4 are consistent with a prior paper 
by Cain and Davidoff which finds that overall, Delaware awards higher 
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attorneys’ fees and dismisses more cases than other states, perhaps to 
compensate for this dismissal rate.95 This is reflected in Table 4, as 
median fees for disclosure-only cases declined from $440,000 to 
$315,000 between 2012 and 2015. Figures for 2016 and 2017 are 
incomplete due to the lack of observations in which attorneys’ fees have 
been awarded because of the lag in time between such settlements and 
fee awards.  
Table 5 examines in more detail the use of federal courts as an 
alternative forum to Delaware.  
 
 TABLE 5: PERCENTAGE OF CASES GOING TO FEDERAL 
COURTS BY DEAL COMPLETION YEAR 
 
# of Federal 
Settlements 
% of All Settled 
Cases in 
Federal Courts 
% of Mootness 
Fees Paid in 
Federal Courts 
Nondisclosure 
Settlements 
2003 0 0% N/A N/A 
2004 0 0% N/A N/A 
2005 2 6% N/A 50% 
2006 3 6% N/A 0% 
2007 0 0% N/A N/A 
2008 0 0% N/A N/A 
2009 0 0% N/A N/A 
2010 3 3% N/A 33% 
2011 1 1% N/A 100% 
2012 6 8% N/A 33% 
2013 6 8% N/A 17% 
2014 5 8% 0% 20% 
2015 10 18% 0% 0% 
2016 14 32% 71% 0% 
2017 4 44% 100% 0% 
Total 54 7% 90% 13% 
 
Table 5 shows a substantial uptick in cases settled in federal 
courts. In unreported figures we also note that 2015 saw 25 federal 
lawsuits, 2016 saw 47, and 2017 is on track to see 113 federal lawsuits 
if the trend during the first ten months continues throughout the year. 
Accompanying that trend, Table 5 shows significant increases in the 
percentages of all settled cases that are in federal court. Cases settled 
 
 95. Cain & Davidoff Solomon, supra note 16, at 469.  
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in federal court represented 0% of cases resolved in 2009. In contrast, 
in 2017, 44% of all settlements were in federal court.  
Table 5 also documents that the primary driver of the federal 
court shift is a rise in mootness fee payments. In 2017, all mootness fee 
payments were in federal court cases. None of the federal court cases 
settled in 2015 through 2017 were nondisclosure settlements, meaning 
that all of these additional federal settlements were disclosure ones. 
These statistics are not surprising; filings in federal court must 
generally allege a disclosure violation as a basis for jurisdiction, and a 
federal court that rejects a disclosure claim need not exercise 
supplemental jurisdiction over any state law fiduciary duty claims. 
Therefore, we would expect to see federal court litigation focus 
primarily on disclosure issues. Two of us argued in another article that 
this focus is appropriate because federal law has developed a specialized 
jurisprudence for addressing disclosure claims.96 The federal courts’ 
expertise in this area suggests that they will be able to work through 
these cases proficiently.  
The question is whether federal courts will be more receptive to 
disclosure claims, disclosure-only settlements, and mootness fee 
payments than the Delaware state courts. At least two federal courts 
have adopted the reasoning of the Trulia decision.97 If other federal 
courts follow these decisions, we would expect to see the rate of federal 
court filings decline in the future.98  
Table 5 also allows us to explore, in a preliminary fashion, the 
possibility that plaintiffs’ lawyers and defendants are deliberately 
colluding to settle suits outside of Delaware. By collusion, we mean 
cases in which an issuer with a Delaware forum selection provision is 
sued in another state court and the board waives or otherwise fails to 
invoke the forum selection provision and instead settles the case. To 
explore this possibility, we examine 2016 announced deals with 
litigation completed by February 2017. The issuers in 59.32% of these 
cases (n=35) have forum selection clauses that select Delaware as the 
exclusive forum for state litigation. The issuers in 11.9% of these cases 
(n=7) have forum selection clauses that name a jurisdiction other than 
 
 96. Fisch et al., supra note 4, at 596–98. 
 97. See In re Walgreen Co. Stockholder Litig., 832 F.3d 718, 725 (7th Cir. 2016); Bushansky 
v. Remy Int’l, Inc., 262 F. Supp. 3d 742, 752–53 (S.D. Ind. 2017) (denying request for over $400,000 
in attorneys’ fees and applying the Trulia standard); see also supra note 73 and accompanying 
text.  
 98. As this Essay goes to press, we are collecting data on additional federal court filings and 
resolutions. Our early results suggest a substantial increase in the number of cases that are 
dismissed as moot and that result in the payment of a mootness fee to plaintiffs’ counsel. We intend 
to document this result and discuss its implications in a subsequent article. 
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Delaware. Of these cases, four were settled in a forum not specified by 
the forum selection clause, but all four cases involved federal court 
litigation which is permitted by all forum selection clauses. Notably, in 
no case was a Delaware forum selection clause ignored to reach a state 
court settlement.  
We note, however, that in five cases from this time period in 
2016 involving litigation filed outside of Delaware against an issuer 
that had a Delaware forum selection clause, a mootness fee was paid to 
plaintiffs’ counsel. The payment of a mootness fee does not directly 
evade Trulia; indeed, Delaware judges have approved the payment of 
mootness fees in post-Trulia cases. Moreover, five cases are not a trend, 
but Table 5 also reveals that in 2016 71% of all mootness fees involved 
cases litigated in federal courts. This number rose to 100% in 2017. 
These cases thus suggest that continued scrutiny of litigation outside 
Delaware is required to determine the extent to which this practice 
provides a viable way for plaintiffs’ counsel to collect fees in weak 
merger cases. 
In Table 6, we look at the number of suits filed in 2015, 2016, 
and 2017 for firms that are either headquartered or incorporated in 
Delaware.  
 
TABLE 6: MEAN NUMBER OF SUITS FILED (2015–2017) 
  
Mean # 
Suits, for 
Filings in: 
DE 
Only 
DE+ 
Fed 
DE+Fed 
+Other 
State 
DE+ 
Other 
State Fed 
Other 
State Overall 
2015 3.7 4.5 9.8 4.9 3.0 3.0 4.3 
[N] 47 6 4 16 1 7 83 
        
2016 2.4 5.0 6.0 3.9 2.3 2.3 2.7 
[N] 25 5 2 9 13 18 82 
        
2017 2.7 3.3 7.0 N/A 2.5 1.3 2.7 
[N] 3 6 1 0 55 3 71         
Average number of suits filed, by venue and deal completion year. 
Sample includes only Delaware-incorporated (or headquartered, but not both) firms.  
 
The number of suits filed is a good measure of plaintiffs’ 
attorneys’ belief in their ability to bring cases that are sufficiently 
successful to warrant a reasonable fee award, either on the merits or 
through a settlement. Historically, the number of suits filed is also a 
good measure of law firm interest in merger litigation. The number of 
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lawsuits peaked in 2011 with a mean of 5.8 suits filed per case involving 
a Delaware firm. Table 6 shows a shift in plaintiffs’ lawyers’ suit rate 
and likely their belief in the prospects for a successful merger litigation 
suit. The overall average number of suits per transaction with litigation 
for all jurisdictions dropped from 4.3 in 2015 to 2.7 in 2017. Delaware-
only suits dropped from an average of 3.7 suits to 2.7 suits per 
completed deal. Meanwhile, in multijurisdictional litigation involving 
Delaware and federal court, the number rose from 4.5 to 5.0 suits in 
2016. This rise further reflects the shift to federal court evidenced in 
other tables and is likely attributable to plaintiffs’ lawyers’ belief that 
they are more likely to get a disclosure-only settlement approved in 
these jurisdictions. It appears also that forum selection clauses are 
limiting litigation.  
Ultimately, our findings reveal a significant shift in merger 
litigation practice post-Trulia. There are fewer suits brought, 
particularly in Delaware. There is an outflow of filings from Delaware 
towards federal court to avoid forum selection clauses and Trulia. There 
is a substantial rise in the percentage of cases with mootness fee 
awards, but an overall reduction in the size of attorneys’ fee awards. 
There also appear to be higher dismissal rates for cases generally. In 
summary, Trulia and other recent changes in Delaware law have 
brought a tidal wave of change to the merger litigation industry.  
III. IMPLICATIONS OF OUR FINDINGS 
A. Litigation Practices Are Responsive to Changes in the Law 
Representative shareholder litigation is shaped by two 
important characteristics: (1) shareholders’ power to sue is based on 
multiple sources of substantive legal rules; and (2) representative 
litigation inevitably involves self-appointed agents acting for the 
investor group.99 One result of these forces’ interaction is that the 
importance of different venues for bringing these cases changes over 
time, and the relative strength of different forms of shareholder 
litigation is dynamic as well.100 If one avenue for vindicating investor 
rights shuts down, entrepreneurial agents in the plaintiffs’ bar will seek 
 
 99. Randall S. Thomas & Robert B. Thompson, A Theory of Representative Shareholder Suits 
and Its Application to Multijurisdictional Litigation, 106 NW. U. L. REV. 1753, 1755 (2012). 
 100. See Hillary A. Sale & Robert B. Thompson, Market Intermediation, Publicness, and 
Securities Class Actions, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 487 (2015) (discussing the evolution of securities 
fraud litigation to enforce state law fiduciary principles). 
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others, while defendants’ attorneys will in turn react to those changes 
in their own way.101 
1. Deal Litigation Moves to Other Jurisdictions 
Our results demonstrate that, as expected, plaintiffs’ attorneys 
respond to litigation incentives that affect deal litigation. When 
Delaware law changed to reduce the likelihood of success in M&A cases, 
plaintiffs’ counsel reacted by filing fewer deal cases in Delaware. When 
Delaware law reduced the size of the expected attorneys’ fee awards in 
these cases, plaintiffs’ counsel again responded by filing fewer deal 
cases in Delaware. At least in the short run, the efforts by Delaware 
courts to reduce the volume of litigation have been successful—these 
trends are particularly apparent in Delaware, with both filing rates and 
settlement rates dropping in 2016 and 2017. 
The changes in Delaware have had some spillover effects as well. 
One practical response to multiforum litigation is for a Delaware 
company to adopt a forum selection bylaw choosing Delaware as the 
appropriate forum. Companies are incentivized to make this choice in 
order to limit litigation and appear to be doing so at significant rates. 
Forum selection bylaws have funneled litigation that might otherwise 
have been filed elsewhere into the Delaware courts. They have also 
discouraged plaintiffs’ counsel from bringing cases outside Delaware, 
since plaintiffs’ lawyers do not want to engage in costly and generally 
fruitless litigation over the validity of forum selection bylaws.  
The ability of plaintiffs to avoid Trulia may be limited still more 
by the continued adoption and use of these forum selection provisions. 
When Trulia is combined with the widespread adoption of forum 
selection clauses, it is likely to leave the merger litigation venue choice 
as between Delaware and federal court. 
The substantive impact of Trulia has not been confined to 
Delaware either. Some courts outside of Delaware are looking more 
closely at disclosure-only settlements and dismissing more of them.102 
Thus, overall merger litigation levels are down, and plaintiffs’ success 
rates in these cases seem to be declining. 
Plaintiffs’ law firms are adjusting to this new reality. A 
significant number of merger lawsuits that these firms might once have 
filed as deal litigation in Delaware have instead been initiated in 
federal court or to a lesser extent in other states’ courts. In federal 
 
 101. See Cain & Davidoff Solomon, supra note 16, at 487–96 (empirically documenting the 
actions and reactions of plaintiffs’ attorneys to shifting legal standards).  
 102. See supra notes 66–73, 76 and accompanying text.  
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courts, these cases are brought as Rule 14a-9 disclosure cases. For 
corporations without forum selection bylaws, plaintiffs can file deal 
litigation in the state court of the state where the target corporation is 
headquartered.  
As plaintiffs have adjusted their tactics, so have defendants. It 
has become common for defendants’ counsel to seek to dismiss deal 
litigation, and the number of dismissed cases has risen sharply. The 
most worrisome development to date is the sharp increase in federal 
court cases that are being litigated as mootness cases.103 Although these 
cases are being dismissed without a release, reflecting the likelihood 
that they are largely nuisance suits, they appear to be generating the 
payment of mootness settlement fees, creating an incentive for 
plaintiffs’ lawyers to continue to file them. These cases appear to 
indicate that plaintiffs’ counsel may be extracting rents by seeking low 
cost payments to “go away.” Mootness fee payments thus likely warrant 
a more thoughtful response by the federal courts.104 
If Delaware is trying to reduce the amount of deal litigation, 
these adjustments by the lawyers involved in them may make 
Delaware’s task more difficult. For example, if non-Delaware courts 
prove, in the long run, to be more receptive forums, either because they 
do not follow Delaware’s restrictions on the scope of merger duties or 
because they approve settlements and fee awards more liberally, then 
Delaware’s ability to curtail the amount of merger litigation will be 
limited.  
The full effect of forum selection provisions remains unclear, 
however. Although the number of issuers adopting forum selection 
clauses is growing, to date, many companies have not adopted them. In 
addition, even those issuers that adopt a forum selection provision may 
waive its application in order to enter into a settlement on terms that 
would not have been permitted by a Delaware court. We find no 
evidence of this behavior in our sample. Indeed, there are a number of 
specific instances where companies have successfully brought motions 
to dismiss litigation based on these clauses.105 Nonetheless, it is far too 
soon to reject this possibility.  
 
 103. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 104. We plan to provide details on the increase in mootness settlements and outline a potential 
federal court response in a subsequent article. 
 105. See, e.g., Petit-Frere v. Office Depot, Inc., No. 502015, 2015 WL 10521805 (Fla. Cir. Ct. 
May 15, 2015) (upholding forum selection bylaw of a Delaware corporation). 
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2. Plaintiffs Shift Resources into Other Forms of Litigation 
If the barriers to deal litigation grow, we would expect to see the 
plaintiffs’ bar shift more resources into other forms of shareholder 
litigation.106 Many of the same plaintiffs’ law firms that file deal 
litigation also are major players in bringing derivative lawsuits and 
federal securities class actions. From the plaintiffs’ perspective, there 
is little reason to think that corporate misconduct is going to disappear, 
so investors will continue to seek legal avenues to redress it. If deal 
litigation is no longer a viable way to address wrongdoing, these firms 
will find alternative forms of shareholder litigation.  
The desire of shareholders and their lawyers to seek viable legal 
alternatives to traditional merger litigation is a plausible explanation 
for the significant increase in appraisal filings in Delaware in 2016. 
This increase occurred against the backdrop of the recent legislative 
changes to the appraisal statute that defendants’ law firms pushed for 
aggressively.107 These reforms eliminated cases where the claims made 
totaled less than $1 million and also gave defendants the option of 
distributing the merger consideration to claimants as a method of 
cutting off prejudgment interest accruals. In both instances, the 
winning argument for reforms was to cut back on strike suits using the 
appraisal statute.108 
While these reforms addressed some of the underlying motives 
for the earlier upsurge in appraisal cases, the most recent filing 
statistics suggest that the new popularity of appraisal litigation is being 
driven by other factors. The most likely explanation is that cases that 
in earlier years would have been filed as deal challenges are no longer 
viable after Corwin, Volcano, and Trulia, so plaintiffs’ attorneys are 
choosing to file them as appraisal actions today. 
 New developments in Delaware, however, could bring an abrupt 
halt to this shift in filing patterns. In several recent cases, Delaware 
courts determined that the merger price is fair value for purposes of the 
 
 106. See Thomas & Thompson, supra note 99, at 1756.  
 107. This earlier round of reform measures is another example of the way that law firms adjust 
to new litigation patterns. Jiang et al., supra note 43, at 698. In the mid-2000s, a small group of 
hedge funds began to take advantage of the Delaware appraisal statute by filing a rapidly 
increasing number of actions seeking damages. As the numbers climbed, signs emerged that some 
of these actions, particularly smaller ones, appeared to be strike suits. Id. Seven Wall Street law 
firms then petitioned the Delaware legislature to amend the appraisal statute to eliminate smaller 
cases and to reduce the prejudgment interest rate awarded, among other things. Ultimately, the 
Delaware legislature did make some, but not all, of the changes requested. Id.  
 108. Section 262 Appraisal Amendments, LOWENSTEIN SANDLER (Mar. 6, 2015), 
https://www.lowenstein.com/files/upload/DGCL%20262%20Proposal%203-6-15%20Explanatory 
%20Paper.pdf [https://perma.cc/RYE6-2PGQ]. 
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appraisal proceeding.109 This approach was recently considered by the 
Delaware Supreme Court in DFC Global Corp. v. Muirfield Value 
Partners, LP.110 The DFC Global court declined to adopt a presumption 
that, in cases involving a robust market check and a fair sales process, 
the deal price is the best evidence of fair value, concluding that the 
adoption of such a presumption should be a legislative decision.111 
Nonetheless, the court emphasized the importance that deal price 
should play in a court’s fair value determination.112 The DFC Global 
decision, coupled with a recent decision appraising a company’s stock 
at a value that was less than half of the deal price,113 may signal a 
conservative trend by the Delaware courts that reduces the 
attractiveness of appraisal litigation to plaintiffs and their counsel and 
that reduces the volume of future appraisal cases as an alternative to 
litigating process issues in a traditional fiduciary duty claim.    
Our analysis suggests that, rather than adopting a broad 
presumption either in favor or against deal price in appraisal litigation, 
the Delaware Supreme Court should be cautious. Unless and until the 
scope of traditional merger litigation has had the opportunity to 
respond to Trulia, Corwin, and the adoption of forum selection bylaws 
and reach a new equilibrium, we cannot be sure how these changes in 
the law will affect litigation practices. Equally importantly, cutting too 
big a swath out of shareholders’ potential remedies for corporate 
malfeasance opens up the possibility that managerial wrongdoing will 
go undetected. In other words, a broad appraisal remedy may be a 
necessary additional safeguard to protect shareholder interests. We 
develop this argument more fully in the next Section. 
B. Type I Versus Type II Error 
The Delaware courts and legislature have been engaged in an 
aggressive campaign to stamp out frivolous shareholder litigation—this 
was undoubtedly the driving force behind forum selection bylaws 
 
 109. See, e.g., Merion Capital L.P. v. Lender Processing Servs., No. 9320-VCL, 2016 Del. Ch. 
LEXIS 189, at *89 (Dec. 16, 2016) (giving “100% weight to the transaction price” where “[t]he 
Company ran a sale process that generated reliable evidence of fair value”); Huff Fund Inv. P’ship 
v. CKx, INC., No. 6844-VCG, 2013 Del. Ch. LEXIS 262, at *49 (Oct. 31, 2013), aff’d, 2015 Del. 
LEXIS 77 (Feb. 12, 2015) (finding “the sales price to be the most relevant exemplar of valuation 
available”).  
 110. DFC Glob. Corp. v. Muirfield Value Partners, L.P., No. 518, 2016, 2017 Del. LEXIS 324, 
at *43–44 (Aug. 1, 2017). 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at *48 (“[T]he basic economic concept of fair market value remains central to our 
statutory concept of fair value.”). 
 113. ACP Master, Ltd. v. Sprint Corp., Nos. 8508-VCL, 9042-VCL, 2017 Del. Ch. LEXIS 125, 
at *2–3 (July 21, 2017). 
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(targeting multijurisdictional deal litigation), Trulia (attacking 
disclosure-only settlements), and the 2016 legislative amendments to 
the Delaware appraisal statute (eliminating small shareholder 
appraisal suits). While few, if any, commentators defend strike suits as 
valuable, the danger of closing all the courthouse doors is that injustices 
go undetected and unpunished. In other words, the price of getting rid 
of bad cases by cutting back on the scope of the law is often 
simultaneously getting rid of good cases that might have been brought 
under the old rules.114 
Corporate law commentators have referred to this as the trade-
off between Type I error (false positives) and Type II error (false 
negatives).115 In the context of securities fraud class action litigation, 
this hypothesis has been applied to the passage of the Private Securities 
Litigation Reform Act (“PSLRA”), a statute that was implemented to 
address perceived strike suits.116 In this context, the PSLRA is claimed 
to have had two effects: it lowered Type I error by reducing the incidence 
of frivolous litigation, but in doing so it increased Type II error by 
blocking non-nuisance suits.117 One empirical study has confirmed that 
this trade-off occurred after the implementation of the PSLRA.118 
These trade-offs will also occur as Delaware cuts back on deal 
litigation through legislative and judicial interventions designed to 
eliminate strike suits. Certainly fewer bad suits will be brought (Type 
I error will decrease)—that is apparent from the data that we presented 
earlier in this paper. What will go undetected, but nevertheless be 
equally certain to occur, is that Type II error will also increase. In other 
words, fewer good cases that would result in substantial judgments 
against corporate wrongdoers will be filed and successfully prosecuted. 
How many good cases will we lose, and what will the impact of 
their disappearance be? In 2015 alone, one commentator identified six 
major settlements in breach of fiduciary duty litigation in the range of 
$70 to $275 million in the Delaware Chancery Court.119 Collectively, 
these cases resulted in one year of over $900 million in recoveries for 
 
 114. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi, Do the Merits Matter Less After the Private Securities Litigation 
Reform Act?, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 598 (2007) (finding evidence that meritorious suits that might 
have previously been filed were deterred by the litigation barriers enacted through the Private 
Securities Litigation Reform Act). 
 115. Lynn A. Stout, Type I Error, Type II Error, and the Private Securities Litigation Reform 
Act, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 711, 711 (1996). 
 116. Id.; Choi, supra note 114, at 603. 
 117. Choi, supra note 114, at 603. 
 118. Id. at 622–23. 
 119. See Friedlander, supra note 35, at 624–25. 
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the shareholders in these companies.120 There are other benefits to be 
gained from judicial sanctions against corporate misconduct as well. 
For instance, they provide courts with the opportunity to lay out the 
rules of the road for deals121 and give judges a pulpit from which they 
preach to corporate directors about the perils of wrongdoing.122 More 
generally, because transactions are negotiated in the shadow of 
potential litigation, the availability of a litigation remedy is likely to 
affect both the price and procedures of future mergers.123 
These trade-offs highlight the need to assess the costs and 
benefits of the litigation reform efforts in Delaware carefully before 
embarking on further cutbacks to shareholders’ ability to challenge 
corporate directors’ actions in mergers and acquisitions for fear we will 
inadvertently cut off valuable shareholder monitoring efforts. 
Litigation patterns will shift, and it will take time before their effects 
on corporate behavior become apparent. The dramatic shifts that our 
data show will stabilize in due course, and at that point it will become 
apparent if more (or less) needs to be done.  
For example, some commentators have recently called for the 
immediate institution of a “loser pays” system in shareholder litigation, 
arguing that deal litigation patterns are evolving too slowly and that 
more needs to be done to stop frivolous litigation.124 They claim that 
deal litigation continues to be a significant problem for companies 
engaged in corporate transactions because forum selection bylaws and 
Trulia have only had a limited impact. They determine that “if Trulia 
fails to eradicate the problem of socially detrimental litigation, 
Delaware should reconsider its prohibition on fee-shifting bylaws.”125 
 
 120. Similar settlements have occurred in other years as well. For example, in 2012, the 
Delaware Supreme Court affirmed a $1.263 billion judgment in a derivative lawsuit challenging 
Southern Peru Copper Corporation’s acquisition of an affiliate. See Ams. Mining Corp. v. Theriault, 
51 A.3d 1213, 1218–19 (Del. 2012).  
 121. See Davidoff Solomon & Thomas, supra note 9, at 10. 
 122. Edward B. Rock, Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work?, 44 
UCLA L. REV. 1009, 1016 (1997). 
 123. See, e.g., Albert H. Choi & Eric L. Talley, Appraising the “Merger Price” Appraisal Rule 
(Va. Law & Econ., Research Paper No. 2017-01, 2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=2888420 
[https://perma.cc/WM4B-MWXS] (arguing that the scope of the appraisal remedy affects the 
negotiated deal price in mergers). 
 124. William B. Chandler III & Anthony A. Rickey, The Trouble with Trulia: Re-evaluating 
the Case for Fee-Shifting Bylaws as a Solution to the Overlitigation of Corporate Claims 1–2 (Apr. 
4, 2017) (unpublished manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2946477 
[https://perma.cc/X2NE-JMHW]. 
 125. Id.; see also Sean J. Griffith, Private Ordering Post-Trulia: Why No Pay Provisions Can 
Fix the Deal Tax and Forum Selection Provisions Can’t, in THE CORPORATE CONTRACT IN 
CHANGING TIMES (Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall S. Thomas eds., forthcoming 2018), 
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2855950 [https://perma.cc/5TF6-FPST] (proposing a charter or bylaw 
term prohibiting “corporations from paying attorneys’ fees for specified litigation outcomes”). 
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In essence, what these commentators are calling for is an 
extreme trade-off between Type I and Type II error. Even if Trulia was 
100% effective in stopping disclosure-only settlements, it would not 
eliminate Type I error since there could still be frivolous cases where 
the settlement included other elements besides disclosure changes. 
“Eradicating” Type I error is only possible by eliminating all forms of 
representative shareholder litigation, which may well be the effect of 
permitting fee-shifting bylaws. However, as we just discussed, 
eliminating all forms of representative litigation would also eliminate 
valuable cases that generate compensation to injured shareholders and 
deter future managerial wrongdoing.126 
C. Delaware’s (Re-)Balancing Act 
These changes in deal litigation, and more broadly in 
shareholders’ ability to sue to enforce their rights, have further 
implications in the age-old debate about Delaware’s competition with 
other states both for corporate litigation and more broadly for corporate 
charters. The debate between Cary and Winter over whether Delaware 
law is leading a race to the bottom or a race to the top centers on 
whether corporate codes benefit shareholders.127 Many corporate law 
academics have contributed to this debate, and while there are many 
disagreements among these commentators about different aspects of 
the competition, there seems to be nearly universal agreement that 
Delaware has emerged victorious thus far in that competition.128 
The shifting tides of merger litigation may be stirring up the 
waters of this competition again. The explosion in multijurisdictional 
deal litigation was one of the forces that stimulated the Delaware 
legislature to take action to validate forum selection bylaws. These 
bylaws were intended to funnel cases out of other states’ courts into the 
Delaware Chancery Court. However, as the legal rules in Delaware got 
tougher on deal cases, the consequence was that plaintiffs looked to 
 
 126. Similarly, if the Delaware courts shut down appraisal litigation completely, it will result 
in fewer good cases being filed under the statute—that is, greater Type II error. In the appraisal 
area, there is a second negative effect on deterring misconduct as the discovery in these cases can 
uncover fraud and breaches of fiduciary duties as well. The Delaware courts have permitted the 
plaintiffs in these circumstances to pursue both actions. Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., 542 A.2d 
1182, 1184–85 (Del. 1988). 
 127. See Jill E. Fisch, The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for 
Corporate Charters, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 1061, 1064–65 (2000) (summarizing the Cary-Winter 
debate). 
 128. See, e.g., ROBERTA ROMANO, THE GENIUS OF AMERICAN CORPORATE LAW (1993).  
Cain_Galley(Do Not Delet3/7/2018 9:54 AM 
638 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW [Vol. 71:2:603 
other jurisdictions as safer havens. States that had lost out to Delaware 
in earlier times now may become preferred venues for shareholders.129  
The large number of plaintiffs’ law firms and availability of 
alternative forums mean that litigation may migrate and that Delaware 
rules may not have foreclosing or in toto effects.130 In particular, 
Delaware’s rules may not be adopted or may be circumvented in other 
jurisdictions, particularly to the extent they are viewed as procedural 
in nature. One court in New York, for example, went so far as to develop 
an alternative legal doctrine for assessing settlements in disclosure-
only litigation.131  
Other stakeholders in the corporate law competition have much 
to gain or lose from these shifts. The Delaware bar, whose role as a key 
player in this competition was first explained by Professors Macey and 
Miller,132 might well be worried about Delaware law shifting too far 
towards the defense side viewpoint on shareholder litigation and the 
resulting demise, or outmigration, of corporate litigation. While many 
Delaware attorneys, even on the plaintiffs’ side, supported cutting back 
on frivolous litigation outside of Delaware (and therefore supported 
forum selection bylaws), they were much less willing to back fee-
shifting bylaws when those came before the Delaware legislature. 
The responsiveness of litigation trends to the foregoing legal 
developments highlights the delicate tightrope that Delaware walks in 
balancing the interests of shareholders in minimizing corporate 
wrongdoing against the interests of corporate management in avoiding 
strike suit deal litigation as well as any conflicts with interests of other 
stakeholders in the Delaware corporate law enterprise. If Delaware law 
in this area becomes too favorable to any set of these players, then it 
will get push back from the opposing set of actors. In setting up its 
corporate law rules and enforcement, Delaware must take all those 
 
 129. A number of papers predicted, as a matter of theory, that this would happen. See, e.g., 
Armour et al., supra note 24, at 640 (“[B]oth for large M&A and LBO transactions, Delaware is 
increasingly being bypassed as a litigation venue.”); Cain & Davidoff Solomon, supra note 16, at 
499–500 (“[C]ertain states with an interest in attracting business litigation respond to this 
jurisdictional forum shopping by rewarding higher attorneys’ fees and more favorable outcomes 
when these states have seen cases migrating towards other jurisdictions.”). 
 130. See C.N.V. Krishnan, Steven Davidoff Solomon & Randall S. Thomas, Who Are the Top 
Law Firms? Assessing the Value of Plaintiffs’ Law Firms in Merger Litigation, 18 AM. L. & ECON. 
REV. 122, 143 (2016) (concluding that top plaintiffs’ firms “are significantly and positively 
associated with a higher probability of lawsuit success for plaintiffs”). 
 131. See Gordon v. Verizon Commc’ns, Inc., 148 A.D.3d 146, 156–64(N.Y. App. Div. 2017) 
(setting forth an enhanced seven-part test to consider whether a proposed settlement merits 
approval). 
 132. Jonathan R. Macey & Geoffrey P. Miller, Toward an Interest Group Theory of Corporate 
Law, 65 TEX. L. REV. 469, 522–23 (1987). 
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interests into account or risk losing its dominant position in attracting 
corporate charters.  
We do not suggest in this Essay that Delaware law has become 
too restrictive—indeed, the statistics on merger litigation suggest that 
the recent changes are quite modest and that the volume of litigation, 
at least to date, remains sufficient to discipline the merger process. The 
analysis is useful, however, in reinforcing the fact that the ultimate 
check on changes in Delaware corporate law is the desirability of 
Delaware as a state of incorporation.  
CONCLUSION 
We examine the shifts in merger litigation following substantial 
developments in Delaware law regarding merger litigation, including 
the Trulia decision. We find that Trulia and its progeny have 
substantially disrupted merger litigation. Short-term effects include an 
increase in federal filings, a reduction in Delaware filings and 
settlements, and a rise in mootness fee payments. Moreover, while the 
overall volume of merger litigation has declined, it is still very high.  
One reason for the continued high rate of litigation, at least in 
the short term, is that plaintiffs’ lawyers are attempting to evade the 
restrictions of Delaware law by bringing claims elsewhere. Our 
empirical results demonstrate a high degree of responsiveness by 
plaintiffs’ counsel in terms of venue shifts as well as shifts in the types 
of claims brought. We also see rapidly shifting tactics being employed 
by defense side firms. The responsiveness of the lawyers involved 
suggests that Delaware does not have complete freedom to adjust the 
merger litigation ecosystem. The Delaware courts and legislature must 
take this responsiveness into account. 
Whether, however, these market-based responses will enable 
counsel to evade the effect of Delaware law remains unclear. Forum 
selection clauses may prove effective in limiting the ability of 
opportunistic plaintiffs to bring cases in other state courts. Federal 
courts may treat disclosure claims and settlements with similar 
skepticism to that shown by the Trulia decision. And mootness fees may 
not provide an adequate financial payoff to warrant the filing of low-
value cases in the long term, despite the current sharp uptick of cases. 
Furthermore, shutting down all avenues for shareholders to stop 
managerial misconduct raises a strong likelihood of also cutting out 
valid cases that would expose unwanted behavior. 
As a result, we argue that the Delaware courts and legislature 
should hold off on further litigation reforms. Instead, caution is 
warranted until the full impact of the recent changes has been 
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incorporated into the merger ecosystem and the federal courts can 
address the rise in mootness fees. At that time, Delaware can determine 
whether its litigation system provides an appropriate balance between 
protecting shareholder value and limiting litigation abuse. 
 
